mcp-connection-audit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses sensitive configuration paths including
~/.config/claude/claude_desktop_config.jsonand%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json. These files contain authentication tokens and server configurations. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to read system keychain data using
security find-generic-passwordon macOS andsecret-tool lookupon Linux to audit OAuth tokens stored for Claude Code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution using
claude mcp status,claude mcp test, andclaude mcp login/logout. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a risk of command injection as user-provided
$ARGUMENTSare interpolated directly into shell commands (e.g.,claude mcp test <server-name>) without visible sanitization logic. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and parsing
.mcp.jsonfiles from the current working directory. - Ingestion points:
.mcp.json(Phase 1, step 3) - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions.
- Capability inventory: File read/write to global config, shell command execution via
claudeCLI tools. - Sanitization: None identified; the skill directly parses and cross-references local files with global state.
Audit Metadata