mcp-connection-audit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses sensitive configuration paths including ~/.config/claude/claude_desktop_config.json and %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json. These files contain authentication tokens and server configurations.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to read system keychain data using security find-generic-password on macOS and secret-tool lookup on Linux to audit OAuth tokens stored for Claude Code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution using claude mcp status, claude mcp test, and claude mcp login/logout.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a risk of command injection as user-provided $ARGUMENTS are interpolated directly into shell commands (e.g., claude mcp test <server-name>) without visible sanitization logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and parsing .mcp.json files from the current working directory.
  • Ingestion points: .mcp.json (Phase 1, step 3)
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: File read/write to global config, shell command execution via claude CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: None identified; the skill directly parses and cross-references local files with global state.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 10:35 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — mcp-connection-audit