monitoring
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses explicit override instructions: 'You are in AUTONOMOUS MODE. Do NOT ask questions. Do NOT pause for confirmation.' This attempts to bypass the agent's interactive safety protocols and decision-making logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands for validation purposes, including
terraform validate,docker build --check, andkubectl dry-run. It also suggests the execution ofdocker composeto start the monitoring stack. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the installation of various instrumentation libraries from official registries, such as
prom-client,prometheus_client, and OpenTelemetry packages. These are well-known observability tools. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In the 'SELF-EVOLUTION TELEMETRY' section, the skill instructs the agent to write execution metadata to
~/.claude/projects/skill-telemetry.md. This targets a hidden directory in the user's home folder outside the standard project workspace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface as it scans project files (YAML, JSON, Terraform, source code) and processes
$ARGUMENTSto generate configuration and scripts. - Ingestion points: Reads project files during Infrastructure Detection (PHASE 1) and accepts user-provided arguments.
- Boundary markers: None identified to separate untrusted file content from generation logic.
- Capability inventory: Performs file writes, package installations, and suggests shell command execution.
- Sanitization: Relies on a 'Self-Healing Validation' phase to check for secrets but lacks explicit sanitization for ingested file content.
Audit Metadata