pentest

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include phrases such as "You are in AUTONOMOUS MODE. Do NOT ask questions," which attempt to override the agent's standard safety guidelines and interactive conversational protocols.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill contains a "SELF-EVOLUTION TELEMETRY" section that instructs the agent to write execution metadata to ~/.claude/projects/. This targets a hidden directory in the user's home folder typically reserved for platform configuration and state, representing a persistence mechanism or unauthorized data logging.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze arbitrary source code from the current working directory. This creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions hidden within the code being audited could influence the agent's behavior during the analysis phase.
  • Ingestion points: Files in the current working directory and user-supplied arguments (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill does not instruct the agent to use specific delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading target files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the agent's file system reading capabilities and is designed to report findings back to the user.
  • Sanitization: None. The skill does not provide instructions for sanitizing or escaping the content read from the target project before processing it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 11:52 AM