permit-compliance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Reads the 'actual codebase', 'package manifests', 'database schemas', and 'core structures' from the target project (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit XML delimiters or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing the codebase.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files to the
docs/directory and the user's home directory (~/.claude/projects/), and it is encouraged to invoke other skills like/cost-overrun-predictorand/security-review(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no mentioned processes for sanitizing or escaping the content of the files read before they are processed by the LLM.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill attempts to maintain a record of its execution across different sessions by writing to a hidden directory.
- Evidence: The 'SELF-EVOLUTION TELEMETRY' section specifically instructs the agent to look for a project memory directory in
~/.claude/projects/and append execution metadata toskill-telemetry.md(SKILL.md). While intended for telemetry, this establishes a mechanism for persisting data in the user's home folder.
Audit Metadata