secure-ship
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill attempts to locate and read from the
~/.claude/projects/directory. This is a sensitive internal directory for the agent's operating environment which may contain session history, project-specific metadata, and context that should remain isolated from skill-level access. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Execution metadata, including outcomes and suggestions for the '/evolve' pipeline, is extracted from the current session and written to a persistent telemetry file (
skill-telemetry.md) in a hidden directory. This creates a data trail in protected areas of the file system to influence future agent behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates multiple high-privilege tools and sub-skills (/ship, /pentest) autonomously and explicitly forbids the agent from asking the user questions. This lack of human-in-the-loop oversight during deployment and active security scanning increases the risk of unintended modifications to the codebase or infrastructure.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted user data via
$ARGUMENTS(SKILL.md) to define feature descriptions and build targets. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard malicious commands embedded within the input feature description.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities across all referenced scripts, including file writing, PR creation, and automated attack simulation.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic for the input arguments before they are passed into automated build and test pipelines.
Audit Metadata