secure-ship

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill attempts to locate and read from the ~/.claude/projects/ directory. This is a sensitive internal directory for the agent's operating environment which may contain session history, project-specific metadata, and context that should remain isolated from skill-level access.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Execution metadata, including outcomes and suggestions for the '/evolve' pipeline, is extracted from the current session and written to a persistent telemetry file (skill-telemetry.md) in a hidden directory. This creates a data trail in protected areas of the file system to influence future agent behavior.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates multiple high-privilege tools and sub-skills (/ship, /pentest) autonomously and explicitly forbids the agent from asking the user questions. This lack of human-in-the-loop oversight during deployment and active security scanning increases the risk of unintended modifications to the codebase or infrastructure.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted user data via $ARGUMENTS (SKILL.md) to define feature descriptions and build targets.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard malicious commands embedded within the input feature description.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities across all referenced scripts, including file writing, PR creation, and automated attack simulation.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic for the input arguments before they are passed into automated build and test pipelines.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 10:57 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — secure-ship