skill-test
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the hidden directory
~/.claude/projects/to append execution metadata to askill-telemetry.mdfile. This path is used by the agent platform to store project-specific data and persistent context, making it a sensitive location for unauthorized writes or logging. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes the full contents of untrusted external
SKILL.mdfiles. A malicious file processed by this skill could contain instructions intended to override the agent's behavior during the validation or dry-run simulation phases. - Ingestion points: Full text of SKILL.md files read from user-provided paths, skill names, or glob patterns in PHASE 1.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded directives in the analyzed content.
- Capability inventory: File system read (PHASE 1), file system write/append (Telemetry section).
- Sanitization: Absent; instructions are parsed and scored without filtering or escaping of the input text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill resolves user-supplied arguments (paths, names, globs) to file paths. While instructions specify resolving from a registry root, unvalidated path resolution can be a surface for directory traversal if the execution environment does not strictly enforce path boundaries.
Audit Metadata