yield-prediction

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local directory ~/.claude/projects/ to read and write execution metadata in the skill-telemetry.md file. While this is used for self-evolution and project memory, accessing hidden configuration directories is a sensitive operation that can expose environment-specific metadata.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to search for and read highly sensitive pharmaceutical data assets, including historian databases (OSIsoft PI, InfluxDB), MES/EBR systems (Syncade, PAS-X), and LIMS data. This access is inherent to the skill's primary function of yield prediction but involves high-value data.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from the filesystem and incorporates it into analytical reports.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context during Phase 1 (Step 1.1) from external historians, batch records, LIMS, and PAT sensors.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to separate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has file-writing capabilities to docs/yield-prediction-analysis.md and skill-telemetry.md (via shell appending).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the ingested process data before it is processed or written to output files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 10:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — yield-prediction