yield-prediction
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local directory
~/.claude/projects/to read and write execution metadata in theskill-telemetry.mdfile. While this is used for self-evolution and project memory, accessing hidden configuration directories is a sensitive operation that can expose environment-specific metadata. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to search for and read highly sensitive pharmaceutical data assets, including historian databases (OSIsoft PI, InfluxDB), MES/EBR systems (Syncade, PAS-X), and LIMS data. This access is inherent to the skill's primary function of yield prediction but involves high-value data.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from the filesystem and incorporates it into analytical reports.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context during Phase 1 (Step 1.1) from external historians, batch records, LIMS, and PAT sensors.
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to separate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file-writing capabilities to
docs/yield-prediction-analysis.mdandskill-telemetry.md(via shell appending). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the ingested process data before it is processed or written to output files.
Audit Metadata