blender-retarget

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/brt_arp.py uses importlib.import_module to dynamically load modules from the user's Blender addons directory. This is done to locate and interface with the Auto-Rig Pro addon's internal helper functions by scanning for specific function definitions within the addon's source files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The test suite file scripts/tests/test_audit_exit.py utilizes subprocess.run to programmatically invoke the Blender executable. This is used to perform automated auditing and integrity checks on saved Blender files outside the primary process.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an ingestion surface for indirect instructions through the processing of external data sources including FBX files, JSON-based animation manifests, and NumPy .npz backup files. Although the skill employs safe loading configurations (such as allow_pickle=False for NumPy), the ingestion of untrusted external assets is a documented risk factor.
  • Ingestion points: manifest files (scripts/brt_library.py), FBX skeletons (scripts/brt_arp.py), and weight backup files (scripts/brt_weights.py).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; data is processed as standard structured formats (JSON/NPZ).
  • Capability inventory: Broad filesystem access via bpy, file read/write for backups, and subprocess execution in tests.
  • Sanitization: Uses json.load for structured data and explicitly disables pickle loading for NumPy files to prevent arbitrary code execution during data restoration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 20, 2026, 03:25 PM