godot-engine-3d-developer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines several tools that ingest and process untrusted external data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The functions
summarize_playtest_feedback(ingestsfeedback_items),summarize_pr_for_game_team(fetches PR diffs and comments), andtriage_game_bug(ingestslog_text) all process external content. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to create/update tasks, trigger remote build and test jobs, and save persistent data via
save_game_memory. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, filtering, or escaping for the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to trigger remote execution on worker machines as part of its core functionality.
- Evidence: Tools such as
run_game_build,run_game_tests,convert_asset_format, andbake_level_contentenqueue jobs for background workers to execute. While this is a planned part of the architecture, it provides the agent with the ability to initiate remote tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The build and test execution tools involve worker machines pulling source code from external repositories.
- Evidence:
run_game_buildandrun_game_teststake abranchparameter to determine which code to fetch and execute. Theregister_3d_assetandconvert_asset_formattools also handle external file paths.
Audit Metadata