handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes handoff documents stored in the
.agents/handoffs/directory to resume tasks, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. However, the skill provides an extensive 'Author Authority' framework inREFERENCE.mdthat instructs the agent to verify the author's identity and permissions (e.g., via GitHub/GitLab APIs) before acting on instructions. It explicitly mandates halting and seeking human intervention if unauthorized content appears to contain instructions. - Ingestion points: Documents in
.agents/handoffs/(e.g.,0001-refactor-auth-layer.md). - Boundary markers: The skill uses a fixed markdown template (
templates/handoff.md) with specific headers like## Goal,## Context, and## Next stepsto structure data. - Capability inventory: Access to
Read,Write,Edit,Grep,Glob, andBash(for git operations andjqprocessing). - Sanitization: Implements a multi-forge authorization check and strictly forbids the inclusion of secrets or signatures in the document body.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled shell script (
templates/resolve-config.sh) to parse configuration from.tituskirch-skills.json. It also utilizes standard git commands (git log,git rev-parse,git fetch,git push) to manage handoff state within the repository. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of session persistence and state management. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to push work-in-progress notes to remote repositories. To prevent accidental data exposure, the skill includes a 'Secret-free' guardrail that explicitly warns agents not to include tokens, API keys, credentials, or environment variables in the handoff documents.
Audit Metadata