skills/tituskirch/skills/merge-deps/Gen Agent Trust Hub

merge-deps

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the eval command to execute shell strings for repository installation ($install) and verification ($verify). These strings are derived from the repository's configuration file (.tituskirch-skills.json) and the detected lockfile type.
  • Evidence: Found in REFERENCE.md within the "Verify the PR's head" section for both GitHub and GitLab recipes, where fetched strings are executed via shell evaluation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external pull/merge requests to drive its logic.
  • Ingestion points: Pull request titles and descriptions retrieved via gh pr view and glab mr list (documented in SKILL.md Workflow Steps 2 and 3).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing PR content, relying solely on author verification as a security boundary.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including merging PRs (gh pr merge/glab mr merge) and executing shell commands via the verify step.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of ingested PR content is performed before it is used to determine update tiers or update types.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 26, 2026, 03:16 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — merge-deps