merge-deps
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
evalcommand to execute shell strings for repository installation ($install) and verification ($verify). These strings are derived from the repository's configuration file (.tituskirch-skills.json) and the detected lockfile type. - Evidence: Found in
REFERENCE.mdwithin the "Verify the PR's head" section for both GitHub and GitLab recipes, where fetched strings are executed via shell evaluation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external pull/merge requests to drive its logic.
- Ingestion points: Pull request titles and descriptions retrieved via
gh pr viewandglab mr list(documented inSKILL.mdWorkflow Steps 2 and 3). - Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing PR content, relying solely on author verification as a security boundary.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including merging PRs (
gh pr merge/glab mr merge) and executing shell commands via the verify step. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of ingested PR content is performed before it is used to determine update tiers or update types.
Audit Metadata