pull-request
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from repository sources including commit messages, branch names, and pull request templates. This content is interpolated into the final PR title and body, creating a surface for indirect instructions to potentially influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
git logoutput,git diffoutput, and various pull/merge request template files (e.g.,.github/pull_request_template.mdor.gitlab/merge_request_templates/*.md). - Boundary markers: Content is organized under markdown headers (e.g., ## Summary), but specific escaping for untrusted interpolation is not defined.
- Capability inventory: Pull request creation and editing via
ghandglabCLIs, andgit pushoperations. - Sanitization: The skill implements a "No secrets in the body" guardrail, scanning for
.envfiles, keys, and tokens to exclude them. It also strips agent attribution lines. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local CLI tools such as
git,gh,glab, andjq. It follows a least-privilege model by only pre-approving read-only commands in itsallowed-toolsconfiguration, ensuring that actions that modify state (like creating a PR or pushing code) require explicit user confirmation. - [SAFE]: The skill references a configuration schema hosted on the author's own GitHub repository (
TitusKirch/skills). This is a legitimate vendor resource used for configuration validation and does not represent a security risk.
Audit Metadata