ssh-management

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive files, including the generation of private ed25519 keys and the modification of the system-wide SSH configuration file (sshd_config), which contains security policies and authentication settings.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The workflow involves adding public keys to the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file and configuring persistent SSH tunnels and aliases in ~/.ssh/config. These operations establish long-term access mechanisms to the target system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the agent executing various system binaries such as ssh-keygen, ssh-copy-id, and the ssh client for creating tunnels and managing remote identities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read and process system logs via the homelab_serviceLogs tool to diagnose connection issues, which introduces an attack surface where malicious log entries could influence agent behavior. * Ingestion points: System logs are read from the Raspberry Pi's SSH daemon via tool output. * Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between log data and core instructions. * Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to perform file writes (authorized_keys), modify system configurations (sshd_config), and restart system services. * Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation applied to the log content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 11:03 AM