claude-print
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
claudeCLI tool using shell commands. It includes mitigation strategies by explicitly defining a restricted list of allowed tools (read-only git subcommands) via the--allowedToolsflag to prevent unauthorized modifications to the codebase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process third-party data, such as code diffs and external feedback, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
<prompt>argument and files stored in the.turbo/claude/directory which are then piped to the CLI's stdin. - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend piping context files to avoid shell interpolation, but they do not provide specific text delimiters or instructions for the sub-agent to distinguish between system prompts and external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
claudeCLI which, although restricted by default, has the capability to read files and execute shell-based git commands. - Sanitization: Documentation explicitly warns the user to avoid using backticks or shell variables (
$) within command arguments to prevent command injection at the shell level.
Audit Metadata