recall-rationale
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/find_transcript.pyusessubprocess.runto executegitcommands (such asrev-parse,blame, andshow) for commit resolution and repository metadata retrieval. Evidence: Therun_gitfunction implementssubprocess.runusing argument lists without the shell, which correctly prevents command injection vulnerabilities from user-supplied file paths or commit SHAs.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data in the form of Claude Code session transcripts (.jsonlfiles) which could contain malicious instructions from previous agent interactions.\n - Ingestion points: The
load_transcript_recordsfunction inscripts/find_transcript.pyreads transcript files from the user's~/.claude/projectsdirectory.\n - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdprovides instructions for the agent to treat excerpts as evidence rather than ground truth, but the script output lacks technical delimiters or explicit warnings to isolate the untrusted transcript content from the agent's instructions.\n - Capability inventory: The script performs local file reads and executes
gitcommands viasubprocess.run.\n - Sanitization: The
clean_textfunction inscripts/find_transcript.pyremoves known noise prefixes and tool markers (e.g.,<command-message>) but does not perform sanitization of potential prompt injection strings within the transcript text body.
Audit Metadata