test-run-rules

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to circumvent platform security boundaries when encountering denials.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md under the "Sandbox Denials" section, the agent is instructed: "When a command failed on a sandbox denial... re-run it via the Bash tool (dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true) before treating the infrastructure as unavailable."
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources and logs without sanitization, creating a vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is told to tail application logs for errors using the Monitor tool and read file contents at specific git references (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions that might be embedded in logs or code files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool (with potential sandbox bypass), browser session management, tmux control, and arbitrary file system writes for scratchpads (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no requirements to escape, filter, or validate the content of the logs or git output before the agent acts upon the information.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires extensive interaction with the host system via shell commands, which increases the impact of other vulnerabilities.
  • Evidence: Instructions for managing tmux sessions, binding unique ports, capturing PIDs, and terminating entire process groups via the Bash tool.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 09:02 PM