meta-document-to-decision
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It ingests data from external sources (PDF, Word, and Excel files) and interpolates this content directly into reasoning prompts. A malicious document could contain hidden instructions designed to influence the 'Bottom-line recommendation' or obscure risks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the workflow through
pdf_extract,docx_extract,xlsx_extract, andpasted_text_extractsteps inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill lacks delimiters (such as XML tags or triple quotes) or specific system instructions to disregard embedded commands when processing extracted text in the
risk_reviewanddecision_briefsteps. - Capability inventory: The skill is granted
filesystem-readandfilesystem-writepermissions to inspect documents and spreadsheets. - Sanitization: While the initial
user_messageis escaped in the intake step, extracted document content is not sanitized or escaped before interpolation into subsequent LLM steps. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes specialized internal sub-skills (
pdf-toolkit,docx, andxlsx) to perform filesystem operations. These tools are used to read and process user-provided documents to extract text, tables, and metadata for analysis.
Audit Metadata