meta-spreadsheet-insight
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external workbooks and uses the output to perform write operations.
- Ingestion points: The
readstep (using thexlsxskill) extracts data from an external spreadsheet referenced in the user request. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when passing the spreadsheet data from the
readstep to thesummarizeskill in theanalyzestep. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to append data to the original workbook (
writebackstep) and write to a local file (memorizestep viamemory_save). - Sanitization: While
user_messageinputs are escaped and truncated, the content of the spreadsheet itself is processed by the summarization model without sanitization, allowing potentially malicious instructions in the data to influence subsequent steps. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: User-provided messages are interpolated into the task description for the
xlsxskill. - Evidence: The
readstep includes{{ inputs.user_message | xml_escape | truncate(512) }}in its task prompt. Although the skill employsxml_escapeandtruncateas defensive measures, the direct inclusion of user-controlled text into a tool command represents a prompt injection surface area.
Audit Metadata