meta-stack-trace-investigator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted data (stack traces provided by the user) which is subsequently used as input for multiple LLM-based reasoning steps.
  • Ingestion points: The user's input message is ingested in the trace_collect and parse_trace steps within SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses XML escaping (xml_escape) and textual separators (triple dashes) to delimit the user data within prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (exec_command) and save data to persistent memory (memory_save).
  • Sanitization: The skill employs significant mitigations, including explicit instructions in the repro_suggestion and degraded_summary steps that strictly forbid the LLM from proposing or executing commands that create, overwrite, or edit files (e.g., prohibiting heredocs, redirection, or tee).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the exec_command tool to perform repository inspections.
  • Evidence: The commands executed (including rg, gh issue list, and git log) are hardcoded within the SKILL.md file with static arguments, preventing the injection of arbitrary user commands into the shell.
  • Scope: These operations are limited to read-only information gathering, such as searching for symbols, listing related issues, and reviewing commit history.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 17, 2026, 12:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — meta-stack-trace-investigator