meta-stack-trace-investigator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted data (stack traces provided by the user) which is subsequently used as input for multiple LLM-based reasoning steps.
- Ingestion points: The user's input message is ingested in the
trace_collectandparse_tracesteps withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML escaping (
xml_escape) and textual separators (triple dashes) to delimit the user data within prompts. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
exec_command) and save data to persistent memory (memory_save). - Sanitization: The skill employs significant mitigations, including explicit instructions in the
repro_suggestionanddegraded_summarysteps that strictly forbid the LLM from proposing or executing commands that create, overwrite, or edit files (e.g., prohibiting heredocs, redirection, ortee). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
exec_commandtool to perform repository inspections. - Evidence: The commands executed (including
rg,gh issue list, andgit log) are hardcoded within theSKILL.mdfile with static arguments, preventing the injection of arbitrary user commands into the shell. - Scope: These operations are limited to read-only information gathering, such as searching for symbols, listing related issues, and reviewing commit history.
Audit Metadata