sub-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is the execution of arbitrary shell commands via the exec_command and background_process tools to manage sub-agent lifecycles.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and install third-party software from an unverified source (@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent). It also encourages dynamic dependency installation using pnpm install within project environments that may contain untrusted code.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches official CLI tools from Anthropic and OpenAI. It also facilitates cloning arbitrary external repositories from GitHub for analysis, refactoring, and review tasks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use CLI flags that bypass standard security confirmations and sandboxing, such as the --yolo flag for Codex and --permission-mode bypassPermissions for Claude Code.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A significant surface for indirect prompt injection exists because the skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external repositories and pull requests. A malicious file within a project could contain instructions that a sub-agent, operating with high autonomy and tool access, might execute on the host system. The instructions lack specific boundary markers or sanitization steps to mitigate this risk.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 1, 2026, 09:27 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sub-agent