sub-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is the execution of arbitrary shell commands via the
exec_commandandbackground_processtools to manage sub-agent lifecycles. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and install third-party software from an unverified source (
@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent). It also encourages dynamic dependency installation usingpnpm installwithin project environments that may contain untrusted code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches official CLI tools from Anthropic and OpenAI. It also facilitates cloning arbitrary external repositories from GitHub for analysis, refactoring, and review tasks.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use CLI flags that bypass standard security confirmations and sandboxing, such as the
--yoloflag for Codex and--permission-mode bypassPermissionsfor Claude Code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A significant surface for indirect prompt injection exists because the skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external repositories and pull requests. A malicious file within a project could contain instructions that a sub-agent, operating with high autonomy and tool access, might execute on the host system. The instructions lack specific boundary markers or sanitization steps to mitigate this risk.
Audit Metadata