subtitle-burner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/burn.pyinvokesffmpegandffprobeviasubprocess.run. It utilizes list-based arguments, which is a secure practice to prevent shell injection vulnerabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect injection via its input parameters. Specifically, the
--font,--primary-colour, and--outline-colourarguments are interpolated into the FFmpegsubtitlesfilter string without escaping. - Ingestion points: User-provided inputs for font styles and colors in
scripts/burn.py(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The script provides specialized escaping for the subtitle file path, but lacks delimiters or escaping for the
force_stylecomponent values. - Capability inventory: File system writes (output MP4) and process control (executing FFmpeg) as defined in
SKILL.mdmetadata. - Sanitization: Missing validation for string-based style arguments, allowing potential manipulation of the FFmpeg filter graph syntax.
Audit Metadata