arch-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from pull request code diffs and file contents to perform architectural reviews.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
gh pr diff,gh pr view, andgit diffcommands in Phase 3. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompt in Phase 5 uses variable interpolation (e.g.,
{diff}) but lacks explicit instructions to the subagent to ignore or disregard instructions embedded within the provided code changes. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
ghandgitand launch subagents with theAgenttool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested diff or file contents before they are processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection (Category 11) in the
SKILL.mdfile using the!prefix. This executes shell commands (echoandcat) at the time the skill is loaded to provide path and version information to the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands using the
gh(GitHub CLI) andgittools to fetch pull request metadata, diffs, and commit history. While these are standard developer tools, they represent a broad capability for interacting with the local environment and remote repositories.
Audit Metadata