review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external architecture documentation and target project files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
architecture/index.mdand all linked documentation files, as well as project files at the user-specified{project_path}. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore malicious instructions that might be embedded in the documentation or code being reviewed.
- Capability inventory: The main agent has file-write capabilities to the
tseng/reviews/directory, and the subagent has file-read capabilities for the target project. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or escaping is applied to the content extracted from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (the
!syntax inSKILL.md) to execute shell commands when the skill is loaded. - The commands
echo "Architecture docs: ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/architecture/"andecho "Version: $(cat "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/VERSION")"are used to output skill metadata to the agent context. - This implementation is currently safe as it does not involve network operations, access to sensitive system credentials, or the injection of untrusted user input into the shell commands.
Audit Metadata