review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external architecture documentation and target project files.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads architecture/index.md and all linked documentation files, as well as project files at the user-specified {project_path}.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore malicious instructions that might be embedded in the documentation or code being reviewed.
  • Capability inventory: The main agent has file-write capabilities to the tseng/reviews/ directory, and the subagent has file-read capabilities for the target project.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or escaping is applied to the content extracted from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (the ! syntax in SKILL.md) to execute shell commands when the skill is loaded.
  • The commands echo "Architecture docs: ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/architecture/" and echo "Version: $(cat "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/VERSION")" are used to output skill metadata to the agent context.
  • This implementation is currently safe as it does not involve network operations, access to sensitive system credentials, or the injection of untrusted user input into the shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 14, 2026, 11:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — review