obelisk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to interact with the host system using the
Bashtool to run theobeliskCLI for indexing and querying history. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dynamic execution pattern where it writes JavaScript code to temporary
.mjsfiles and then executes them via theobelisk --querycommand. The documentation explicitly warns that these scripts run with the privileges of the CLI process and are not sandboxed. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest untrusted data from historical session logs and memories. This content could contain malicious instructions from previous interactions that could be reactivated when retrieved.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from the
~/.obelisk/obelisk.sqlitedatabase using several retrieval helpers (search,messages,memories,summaries). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting retrieved history to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
ReadandBashcapabilities (restricted to theobeliskCLI). - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of retrieved historical text is documented or implemented in the provided query patterns.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill facilitates access to sensitive local information, including full conversation transcripts, tool inputs/outputs, and project-specific metadata stored by various coding agents.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: In
SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to request escalated permissions (sandbox_permissions: "require_escalated") if it encounters permission errors (SQLITE_READONLY,EACCES) while attempting to write to the Obelisk storage directory.
Audit Metadata