obelisk

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to interact with the host system using the Bash tool to run the obelisk CLI for indexing and querying history.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dynamic execution pattern where it writes JavaScript code to temporary .mjs files and then executes them via the obelisk --query command. The documentation explicitly warns that these scripts run with the privileges of the CLI process and are not sandboxed.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest untrusted data from historical session logs and memories. This content could contain malicious instructions from previous interactions that could be reactivated when retrieved.
  • Ingestion points: Data is pulled from the ~/.obelisk/obelisk.sqlite database using several retrieval helpers (search, messages, memories, summaries).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting retrieved history to the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses Read and Bash capabilities (restricted to the obelisk CLI).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of retrieved historical text is documented or implemented in the provided query patterns.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill facilitates access to sensitive local information, including full conversation transcripts, tool inputs/outputs, and project-specific metadata stored by various coding agents.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: In SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to request escalated permissions (sandbox_permissions: "require_escalated") if it encounters permission errors (SQLITE_READONLY, EACCES) while attempting to write to the Obelisk storage directory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 12:09 PM