obelisk
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to bypass sandbox restrictions by requesting escalated permissions. In
SKILL.md, it directs the agent to rerun commands withsandbox_permissions: "require_escalated"if access to the~/.obeliskdirectory is blocked by standard environment permissions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on generating arbitrary Javascript files and executing them at runtime. The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/api-reference.mdguide the agent to write bounded JS queries to temporary.mjsfiles and then execute them using theobelisk --queryCLI tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from past Claude, Codex, Kimi, and Pi sessions. This session history constitutes untrusted external data that may contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during retrieval.
- Ingestion points: History is retrieved from
~/.obelisk/obelisk.sqlitevia theobeliskCLI, processing messages, tool results, and summaries. - Boundary markers: The provided documentation and patterns do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved history.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
Write(for query files),Bash(for tool execution), andReadcapabilities. - Sanitization: While some helpers use FTS5 tokenization, there is no evidence of robust sanitization or escaping for natural language instructions retrieved from session transcripts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage its query environment, including
mktempfor creating unique script paths andmkdirfor directory management as seen in the 'Quick Start' section ofSKILL.md.
Audit Metadata