pitch-copy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute a Python module with user-provided arguments in a shell string:python3 -m pitch_agent.uiux search --domain landing --query "{product_type}" --limit 3. - Vulnerability: The
{product_type}variable, which is derived from user input or established context, is interpolated directly into the shell command. - Evidence: Found in the 'Design Intelligence' section of
SKILL.md. - Risk: Although the query is wrapped in double quotes, it does not prevent command substitution via backticks or
$(). A malicious user could provide a product type that executes arbitrary system commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an indirect prompt injection surface by using external tools to gather content that influences the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: External data is retrieved via
WebFetchandWebSearch(e.g., to match brand voice). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate fetched content from internal instructions, increasing the risk that the agent will follow malicious instructions embedded in web content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to sensitive tools such as
Bash,Write, andEdit, which could be abused if the agent's logic is hijacked by external data. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill defines
WebFetchandWebSearchas allowed tools. While used for legitimate research into product positioning and brand voice, these tools allow the agent to download and process data from arbitrary, potentially untrusted external domains.
Audit Metadata