sc-brainstorm
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill integrates the
mcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHtool, which is designed to execute arbitrary code provided in thecode_to_executeparameter. The skill documentation provides an example of executing Python code at runtime to process data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, such as market research, competitor analysis, and user feedback files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied topics via flags, search query results from
mcp__rube__RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS, and external file data (e.g.,/tmp/user_feedback.json) processed viamcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are present in the behavioral flow to distinguish untrusted data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to network-enabled tools for document creation and notification (Notion, Slack, Jira, Asana) via
mcp__rube__RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL, as well as arbitrary code execution viamcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define validation, escaping, or filtering mechanisms for the external content before it is processed by the LLM or executed in the workbench.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Through the
RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHtool, the skill allows for host-level operations, such as reading local files and executing logic that could interact with the underlying system environment.
Audit Metadata