sc-document

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill integrates the mcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH tool, which is designed to execute Python code at runtime.
  • Evidence: The documentation provides examples of using code_to_execute with import os to process files and generate documentation blocks. This pattern allows for the generation and execution of arbitrary logic within the agent's environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes external source code and files to generate documentation, creating a vulnerability to malicious instructions hidden in data.
  • Ingestion points: Files and directories specified in commands like /sc:document src/auth/login.js or /sc:document components/ (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not specify delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the code it reads.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read files, write documentation, execute Python code (RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH), and send data to external APIs (SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE, NOTION_CREATE_PAGE).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or safety filtering for the input source code is present.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides automated pathways to send processed content to external services (Notion, Confluence, Slack, GitBook).
  • Evidence: The mcp__rube__RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL is used to publish content to external platform endpoints. While intended for documentation, this creates a channel where sensitive information (like credentials or private logic found in the analyzed code) could be automatically exfiltrated if the agent is not properly constrained.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 08:56 AM