sc-document
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill integrates the
mcp__rube__RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCHtool, which is designed to execute Python code at runtime. - Evidence: The documentation provides examples of using
code_to_executewithimport osto process files and generate documentation blocks. This pattern allows for the generation and execution of arbitrary logic within the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes external source code and files to generate documentation, creating a vulnerability to malicious instructions hidden in data.
- Ingestion points: Files and directories specified in commands like
/sc:document src/auth/login.jsor/sc:document components/(documented inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not specify delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the code it reads.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read files, write documentation, execute Python code (
RUBE_REMOTE_WORKBENCH), and send data to external APIs (SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE,NOTION_CREATE_PAGE). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or safety filtering for the input source code is present.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides automated pathways to send processed content to external services (Notion, Confluence, Slack, GitBook).
- Evidence: The
mcp__rube__RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOLis used to publish content to external platform endpoints. While intended for documentation, this creates a channel where sensitive information (like credentials or private logic found in the analyzed code) could be automatically exfiltrated if the agent is not properly constrained.
Audit Metadata