cognee-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from an external Cognee server and session memory, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in the memory could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved via
curland thecognee-search.shscript fromPOST /api/v1/recalland local CLI output inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard potential instructions within the retrieved memory content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution capabilities through
curl,cognee-cli, and local script execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the data returned from the Cognee server before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands (
curl,cognee-cli, and a provided shell script) to perform its core search functionality. - Evidence: The instructions demonstrate the use of
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cognee-search.shand directcurlcommands to interact with the Cognee API. - Context: While these commands are intended for searching memory, they represent powerful capabilities that could be misused if the agent's context is manipulated via indirect injection.
Audit Metadata