cognee-community
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the use of connectors to ingest data from external platforms such as Slack, Gmail, Notion, and Google Drive. This creates a surface where the agent might process untrusted data containing embedded instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via community connectors (e.g.,
slack_export_source) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not demonstrate the use of boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: Ingested data is processed and stored in graph and vector databases, which the agent may subsequently retrieve and act upon.
- Sanitization: The skill documentation does not mention specific sanitization or filtering protocols for external content before it is stored in the memory engine.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation guides users to install external packages from PyPI to extend the framework's functionality.
- Evidence: Examples include
uv pip install cognee-community-vector-adapter-qdrant. These packages are official community extensions managed by the skill's author and represent the intended use of the framework.
Audit Metadata