self-hosted-companion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user-specified folders which may contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from a user-provided
<folder>, including Obsidian vaults and personal journals (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes Python scripts that read local files, modify a local memory database, and interact with external LLM APIs (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the file contents is described before they are interpolated into the LLM context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses private user directories and sends the content to external LLM providers.
- Evidence: The skill requires an
LLM_API_KEYand notes that every run consumes LLM credits, confirming that the content of private folders (like Obsidian vaults) is sent to external services (SKILL.md). - Sensitive data handling: A rule explicitly warns against printing
.envfiles, acknowledging the agent's access to sensitive environment secrets within the ingested folders. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to run scripts and manage the local database.
- Evidence: The instructions include multiple
uv run pythoncommands to execute scripts within the repository anduv run cognee-clito manage memory datasets (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata