session-analyst
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted transcript data.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches session data and conversation text from signed URLs (
transcript_url) provided by thettai:list_sessionsandttai:get_sessions_batchtools, as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters defined to isolate the transcript content from the agent's internal instructions when generating reports.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to hand off processed data to other connected MCP tools such as
slides,email, anddocsfor distribution, creating a potential path for injected instructions to reach downstream applications. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit instructions for sanitizing, escaping, or filtering the content of the transcripts before they are interpolated into the coaching and performance report templates.
Audit Metadata