skills/toy-crane/skills/babysit-pr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

babysit-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, potentially untrusted sources such as CI logs and bot-generated review comments. An attacker capable of influencing these sources (e.g., by triggering specific test failures or commenting on a PR) could attempt to inject malicious instructions to manipulate the agent's code generation or comment replies.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads PR logs, bot-generated review comments, and human review threads to determine necessary fixes or replies (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions include verification steps, such as "Check each bot finding against the current source before acting on it" and "Fix it only when it describes a real bug," which serve to reduce the likelihood of executing injected instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities, including modifying the local filesystem, performing git commits, and force-pushing to remote branches (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The agent is explicitly instructed to check its own output for secrets, credentials, and personal data before posting it to GitHub (SKILL.md).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a bundled Node.js script (scripts/pr-events.mjs) to monitor PR status via the gh CLI tool.
  • Evidence: The script invokes the GitHub CLI using execFileSync, passing arguments related to the PR identifier and GraphQL queries. While execFileSync provides protection against shell-based command injection, the logic depends on the gh binary's own argument parsing and the security of the environment variables (e.g., BABYSIT_PR_GH) used to locate the executable (scripts/pr-events.mjs).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 13, 2026, 07:13 AM