skills/toy-crane/skills/define-piece/Gen Agent Trust Hub

define-piece

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests various untrusted files within the repository to inform its brief-writing process, creating a vulnerability surface.
  • Ingestion points: Instructions in SKILL.md (lines 18-24) direct the agent to read docs/publications/, GLOSSARY.md, docs/decisions/README.md, PRODUCT.md, and arbitrary source code within the repository.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within these ingested files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files to docs/briefs/, modify GLOSSARY.md, and execute shell commands or source code (SKILL.md, line 33).
  • Sanitization: There are no provisions for sanitizing or validating repository content before processing or execution.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly mandate the execution of code found in the repository to verify technical claims.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md states: "When the piece makes a claim about how code, a tool, or a package behaves, read the source or run it in this repository and use what was observed."
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instruction to "run it in this repository" implies the use of a shell tool to execute local scripts, which could lead to unauthorized command execution if the repository contains malicious scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 10:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — define-piece