expo-dev-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation suggests that if the
agent-deviceCLI tool is missing, the agent should provide the commandnpm install -g agent-device@latestto the user. This recommends an unversioned package from the public NPM registry that is not associated with the primary trusted vendor list or the author's identified vendor resource patterns. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted data generated by the application under test, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious application output could influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed in
SKILL.mdto collect and inspect "app-log collection", "network output", and snapshots of the "React tree, props, hooks" from the running Expo application. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions providing clear delimiters or specific warnings to ignore natural language instructions that might be embedded within the logs or UI metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute shell commands via
agent-deviceandnpx expofor app building, reloading, and interaction (documented inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, escaping, or filtering of the captured application data before it is analyzed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands to interact with the development environment and mobile devices/emulators. While these are functional requirements (e.g.,
agent-device metro reload,npx expo run:ios), they represent a broad execution capability on the host system that is triggered based on the analysis of the aforementioned untrusted inputs.
Audit Metadata