skills/toy-crane/skills/shape-idea/Gen Agent Trust Hub

shape-idea

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, such as third-party package documentation, maintainer statements, and project constraints. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in external resources could influence the agent's behavior during the specification process.
  • Ingestion points: External third-party source code, documentation, maintainer statements, and the project's PRODUCT.md file.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill writes to the local file system (docs/specs/, GLOSSARY.md, DESIGN.md), executes benchmarks and experiments in scratch directories, and triggers other skills capable of installation and prototyping.
  • Sanitization: The instructions mandate that any conclusion about a third-party tool must be confirmed against the project's own versions in a scratch copy before implementation, providing a manual verification step.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill coordinates with the add-stack-context skill, which is explicitly described as 'owning discovery, source acceptance, installation' for new technologies selected during the shaping process. This represents a capability where design decisions can lead to automated software installation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to run experiments, benchmarks, and previews to verify technical decisions. While the skill specifies using a scratch directory outside the working tree to mitigate side effects, this still involves the execution of code associated with the project being analyzed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 08:26 AM