autonomous-loops

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a command to download and execute a shell script from a remote URL using a pipe to bash. \n
  • Evidence: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh | bash in SKILL.md. \n
  • This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary code from an external source without user review. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external tools and scripts hosted on a third-party GitHub account (AnandChowdhary) that are not from a verified organization. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides several bash scripts designed to automate development workflows, including file system modifications, Git commits, and interacting with GitHub via the gh CLI. \n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture facilitates indirect prompt injection by design through ingestion of untrusted files. \n
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read specification files (e.g., docs/auth-spec.md) and persistent note files (e.g., SHARED_TASK_NOTES.md) to guide its actions. \n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to distinguish between task data and potential malicious instructions within these files. \n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to claude -p, bash, and Git tools, allowing it to modify the codebase based on ingested data. \n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnandChowdhary/continuous-claude/HEAD/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Aug 25, 2026, 05:23 AM