sec-fetch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local bash script using arguments that are directly interpolated into a command string.
- Evidence:
bash ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/sec-fetch/scripts/sec-fetch.sh "<url>" "<sec.user>" "<sec.email>"inSKILL.md. - Risk: Unsanitized input for the URL or user credentials could allow for command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters such as backticks or subshells.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes a URL from external agent context without sanitization, providing an attack surface for malicious instructions or characters.
- Ingestion points: The
<url>argument inSKILL.mdprovided by the calling skill. - Boundary markers: Absent. The input is used directly in a shell command and passed to a script.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
bash) and network requests (curl). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not verify the domain or sanitize the string before execution.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends user-identifiable information (name and email) to any URL provided to the fetch command.
- Evidence:
curl -sf -H "User-Agent: ${NAME} ${EMAIL}" "$URL"inscripts/sec-fetch.sh. - Risk: Although the skill is intended for SEC domains, it does not restrict the target domain. A malicious agent could provide a URL to an attacker-controlled server, causing the skill to exfiltrate the user's name and email address via the User-Agent header.
Audit Metadata