openai-gh-fix-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a bundled Python script
scripts/inspect_pr_checks.pythat executes system commands to interact with the GitHub environment. It usessubprocess.runwith list-based arguments to prevent shell injection vulnerabilities while calling thegitandgh(GitHub CLI) binaries. - Evidence: Functions
run_gh_commandandfind_git_rootinscripts/inspect_pr_checks.pyusesubprocess.runto callgh auth status,gh pr view,gh pr checks,gh run view, andgit rev-parse. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface because it ingests external, untrusted content from GitHub Actions logs and passes it to the agent for summarization and fix planning.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/inspect_pr_checks.pyfetches logs from GitHub Actions runs and jobs via theghCLI. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when providing log snippets to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Write,Edit, andBashcapabilities, which are high-impact tools used to implement the fix plan generated from the logs. - Sanitization: Log content is extracted based on failure markers (e.g., 'error', 'fail', 'traceback') but is not sanitized for natural language instructions that might trick the agent into performing unintended actions.
Audit Metadata