openai-jupyter-notebook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/new_notebook.pyscript takes a--titleargument which is interpolated directly into a markdown cell in the generated Jupyter notebook. This creates a surface where a maliciously crafted title could include instructions designed to influence AI agents that read or execute the notebook later. - Ingestion points: The
--titleCLI parameter processed inscripts/new_notebook.py. - Boundary markers: None present. The input is placed directly into the notebook's markdown source list.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows
WriteandBashtools, enabling file creation and script execution. It also recommends installingjupyterlabfor execution environments. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the title string before it is written to the notebook JSON structure.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves the agent executing a local Python script (
scripts/new_notebook.py) using theuv runcommand. While intended for scaffolding, this involves passing user-influenced arguments to a shell command. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions suggest using the
uvpackage manager to installjupyterlabandipykernelfrom official Python registries to enable local execution of the generated notebooks.
Audit Metadata