openai-pdf
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions include commands that require administrative privileges to install system-level utilities. Although intended for setup, agents executing these commands may bypass system restrictions.
- Evidence: The skill provides a command for installing system tools on Ubuntu/Debian using
sudo apt-get install -y poppler-utilsinSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents from external sources, presenting an attack surface where embedded instructions could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: PDF files are read and processed using
pdfplumberandpypdfas described in the workflow section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat extracted PDF content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for shell execution and has file modification access via theWriteandEdittools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are outlined for text extracted from external documents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on fetching and installing several third-party libraries and system utilities.
- Evidence: The skill specifies the installation of
reportlab,pdfplumber, andpypdfvia Python package managers, as well as thepopplerutility via system package managers (Homebrew or APT).
Audit Metadata