openai-pdf

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions include commands that require administrative privileges to install system-level utilities. Although intended for setup, agents executing these commands may bypass system restrictions.
  • Evidence: The skill provides a command for installing system tools on Ubuntu/Debian using sudo apt-get install -y poppler-utils in SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents from external sources, presenting an attack surface where embedded instructions could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: PDF files are read and processed using pdfplumber and pypdf as described in the workflow section of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat extracted PDF content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool for shell execution and has file modification access via the Write and Edit tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are outlined for text extracted from external documents.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on fetching and installing several third-party libraries and system utilities.
  • Evidence: The skill specifies the installation of reportlab, pdfplumber, and pypdf via Python package managers, as well as the poppler utility via system package managers (Homebrew or APT).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 23, 2026, 04:26 AM