cairo-vulnerability-scanner

Warn

Audited by Runlayer on Feb 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUM
Scan Summary
Max Score
78%
Files
2
Flagged
2
Chunks
5
Flagged Files (2)
SKILL.mdHIGH
78.3%

Tool passed security scan

Malicious tool definition detected

Tool: SKILL.md [2/2] Description: CI Integration ```yaml # .github/workflows/security.yml - name: Run Caracal run: | pip install caracal caracal detect src/ --fail-on high,critical ``` --- ## 9.

resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.mdHIGH
78.3%

Tool passed security scan

Malicious tool definition detected

Tool: resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md [2/3] Description: msgHash, uint256 nonce ) external { require(messageOwner[msgHash] == msg.sender, "Not message owner"); uint256[] memory payload = new uint256[](2); payload[0] = uint256(uint160(msg.sender)); payload[1] = msg.value; // Complete cancellation (after delay) starknetCore.cancelL1ToL2Message( l2Contract, DEPOSIT_SELECTOR, payload, nonce ); // Return funds to user (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: msg.value}(""); require(success, "Tra

let current_balance = self.balances.read(user); self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount); } // VULNERABLE: Only validates on L1 side // L1 Contract has access control function depositToL2() external onlyAuthorized { starknetCore.sendMessageToL2(...); } // But L2 doesn't check - attacker deploys their own L1 contract!

Audit Metadata
Max File Score
78%
Classification
UNKNOWN_SERVER
Files Scanned
2
Files Flagged
2
Chunks Analyzed
5
Analyzed
Feb 22, 2026, 12:34 AM