interpreting-culture-index
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In
SKILL.md, the instructions advise the user to install theuvtool using a shell script fetched viacurlfromhttps://astral.sh/uv/install.sh. While this is a standard installation method for a well-known developer tool, it involves piping remote content to a shell. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is directed to use the
Bashtool to run a local script,scripts/extract_pdf.py, via theuv runcommand. This is used to extract trait values from assessment PDFs for further analysis. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes assessment data from PDF files using OCR and image processing in
scripts/culture_index/opencv_extractor.py. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious content embedded in a PDF could be ingested into the agent context. - Ingestion points: PDF files are processed by
scripts/extract_pdf.py. - Boundary markers: The extraction script converts PDF data into a structured JSON format, which acts as a data boundary, though the agent later interprets the content of these fields.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Read,Grep,Glob, andWritetools, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: The script performs coordinate-based extraction for charts and OCR for metadata but does not explicitly sanitize the extracted text for prompt injection instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The extraction script declares dependencies on public Python packages (e.g.,
opencv-python-headless,numpy,pdf2image) which are automatically downloaded from public registries when the script is executed via theuvtool.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata