trailmark-finding-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external security reports, SARIF files, and code excerpts to perform analysis. This creates a theoretical surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External findings are ingested in Step 1 of the workflow (described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/input-normalization.md), including SARIF results, weAudit annotations, and Markdown finding excerpts. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation includes logical boundaries (warning not to trust scanner severity and requiring manual review targets), but does not explicitly specify technical prompt delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the LLM when interpolating this data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Read,Grep,Glob, andWritetools, and executes Python code snippets to interact with thetrailmarkquery engine. - Sanitization: The skill employs a formal normalization step in
references/input-normalization.mdthat maps various input types into a structured JSON record before graph analysis, which serves as a sanitization and validation layer. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes Python code snippets and the
trailmarklibrary to perform graph-based queries and pre-analysis on target directories. - Evidence:
references/query-recipes.mdprovides Python templates for initializing theQueryEngine, runningengine.preanalysis(), and executing reachability queries. This execution is local to the analysis environment and is the core functionality provided by the vendor to analyze the target codebase.
Audit Metadata