wycheproof
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's YAML frontmatter contains deceptive and misleading metadata regarding its provenance.
- Evidence: The
createdByandupdatedByfields specifygithub-copilot/gpt-5.6-sol, a non-existent version of GPT. - Evidence: The
createdAtandupdatedAttimestamps are set in August 2026, which is in the future. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and interpret external cryptographic test vectors, which provides an attack surface for instructions embedded in data.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/check-vectors.pyparses external JSON files provided as input paths. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore natural language content within the JSON fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution (
python3andgo run) to process these external files. - Sanitization: Absent. While
scripts/check-vectors.pyvalidates JSON structure and data types, it does not sanitize or filter string fields (such asnotesorcommentfields typically found in Wycheproof vectors) for potential prompt injection payloads. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands to validate test corpora and run linter tools.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the execution ofpython3 scripts/check-vectors.pywith user-provided paths. - Evidence:
references/vector-format.mdinstructs the execution ofgo run ./tools/vectorgen fmtandgo run ./tools/vectorgen lintusing specific environment variables (GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2).
Audit Metadata