lib-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
bunx ctx7@latestto download and execute the latest version of thectx7package from the NPM registry. This involves executing code from a third-party source that is not verified as a trusted vendor, potentially allowing for the execution of malicious scripts if the package is compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/llms-probe.shutility performs network requests to arbitrary user-provided domains usingcurl. It specifically uses the-k(or--insecure) flag, which disables SSL certificate verification, making the connection susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell script execution (
bash scripts/llms-probe.sh) and external CLI tools (bunx). These execution paths could be exploited if user-supplied inputs are not properly sanitized before being passed as arguments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests documentation data from external websites, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches documentation files like
llms.txtandllms-full.txtfrom remote servers and processes output from thectx7tool. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific markers or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the data fetched from documentation.
- Capability inventory: The environment allows for file system access, network requests via
curl, and package execution viabunx. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validating the remote documentation content before it is presented to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata