cryptography
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to process data from external, untrusted sources such as cryptographic oracles and JWT headers, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data ingested from target service responses in padding oracle scenarios (e.g., in
cbc-padding-oracle.mdandpkcs1-v1.5-bleichenbacher.md) and JWT payload components injwt-alg-confusion.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or security warnings to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions embedded within the processed cryptographic data.
- Capability inventory: The skill encourages writing scripts that perform complex calculations and network requests, which could be influenced by malicious input.
- Sanitization: There is no documentation regarding the sanitization or validation of the structure of responses received from external oracles.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes techniques that require network operations to interact with external target services (oracles).
- Evidence: Scenarios such as
cbc-padding-oracle.mdandecb-prefix-oracle.mddescribe using tools likerequestsandcurlto send crafted ciphertexts to a target URL and observe the results. - Context: These network operations are intended for target analysis rather than exfiltrating user credentials, but they constitute interactions with non-whitelisted external domains.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the use of several external security libraries and research tools.
- Evidence: Documentation suggests the use of
fpylll,randcrack,yafu,gmp-ecm, and research repositories for specific attacks (e.g.,mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks,defund/coppersmith). - Context: The referenced resources are standard, well-known tools within the cryptography and security research community.
Audit Metadata