skills/trapple/skills/llm-wiki/Gen Agent Trust Hub

llm-wiki

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local scripts and shell commands. Specifically, it invokes python3 ~/ObsidianVault/scripts/update_indexes.py after ingestion and linting operations, and uses ~/ObsidianVault/scripts/llm_wiki_q_timer.sh for performance tracking. It also relies on shell commands like grep, cat, mv, and mkdir to manage and search vault content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external sources, including documentation folders in ~/repos/ and web clippings in ~/ObsidianVault/raw/Clippings/. This content is untrusted and presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Markdown files located in ~/ObsidianVault/raw/ and ~/repos/**/docs/**/*.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" directives to isolate the agent from potentially malicious instructions embedded in the source material.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to write to the wiki, move files, and execute local scripts, which could be abused if an injection is successful.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering logic is specified for the external content before it is processed into summaries or integrated into the knowledge base.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates broad read and write access to the user's entire Obsidian Vault and all git repositories under ~/repos/. While this is part of its core functionality, it creates a significant exposure surface for personal and professional data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 2, 2026, 06:36 PM