llm-wiki
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local scripts and shell commands. Specifically, it invokes
python3 ~/ObsidianVault/scripts/update_indexes.pyafter ingestion and linting operations, and uses~/ObsidianVault/scripts/llm_wiki_q_timer.shfor performance tracking. It also relies on shell commands likegrep,cat,mv, andmkdirto manage and search vault content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external sources, including documentation folders in
~/repos/and web clippings in~/ObsidianVault/raw/Clippings/. This content is untrusted and presents a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Markdown files located in
~/ObsidianVault/raw/and~/repos/**/docs/**/*.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or "ignore instructions" directives to isolate the agent from potentially malicious instructions embedded in the source material.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to write to the wiki, move files, and execute local scripts, which could be abused if an injection is successful.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering logic is specified for the external content before it is processed into summaries or integrated into the knowledge base.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates broad read and write access to the user's entire Obsidian Vault and all git repositories under
~/repos/. While this is part of its core functionality, it creates a significant exposure surface for personal and professional data.
Audit Metadata