brand-onboarding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from multiple sources to generate persistent guidelines.
- Ingestion points: The skill allows users to provide local file paths (e.g.,
./brand-deck.pdf), remote URLs (e.g.,https://acme.com/brand), and pasted text for extraction as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/wizard-questions.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the ingested brand documents.
- Capability inventory: The skill relies on the agent's ability to read local files, fetch content from network URLs, and write files to the local directory
~/Documents/Brand Guidelines/. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the extracted content before it is saved into the brand guidelines file, which is then consumed by other agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates file system interaction by directing the agent to read user-provided file paths and write generated content to the user's home directory. While functional, this requires the agent to handle user-supplied paths that could potentially target sensitive files if manipulated.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality for the agent to fetch remote content and download logo files from URLs provided by the user, which is a standard part of its onboarding workflow but depends on the reputation of the external sources.
Audit Metadata